This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially excludable along social links. Individuals face a capacity constraint in that, conditional upon providing, they may nominate only a subset of neighbours as co-beneficiaries.
Introduction
Since the observations of British economist William Forster Lloyd over 180 years ago (referred to as 'the tragedy of the commons' by Hardin (1968) ), economists have been aware of difficulties that arise when shareable resources come up against capacity constraints. Examples appear everywhere: local schools have only so many classrooms and so many teachers, public parks can become congested on sunny days, six friends cannot all fit into a five-seater car, the online streaming provider Netflix only allows four devices stream simultaneously so families of five or more may experience disagreements, and so on. Even with some classic public goods examples like fireworks displays, there are often superior vantage points for which people compete such that potential late-comers might not bother. In this paper we tackle issues of this type. That is, what happens when individuals who provide a costly good can't share with everyone?
To address the above, we develop a model wherein individuals live on a graph G (vertices represent individuals and edges represent connections between pairs) and must make a two-pronged decision: (i) choose how much of a costly good to provide, and (ii) choose a subset of neighbours to nominate as co-beneficiaries. In the simplest version of the model, that we term the "Netflix Game" as it is inspired by the online streaming provider Netflix, the quantity choice is binary: each individual simply decides whether to purchase an account or not. If individual i purchases an account then she nominates min {κ(i), d G (i)} neighbours as co-beneficiaries, where κ(i) is an exogenously given number known as i's capacity and d G (i) is i's degree in G.
1 Preferences are such that it is always better to have access to Netflix than not, but due to its cost it is preferable for a neighbour to purchase and nominate you as a co-beneficiary of their account than to purchase an account yourself.
Our focus is on pure strategy Nash equilibria, wherein every individual is either a 'Driver', D, who purchases a Netflix account, or a 'Passenger', P , who free rides.
Our first result, Theorem 1, shows the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for any graph and any capacity function κ on the vertices of the graph. The proof is constructive and amounts to showing, for a given capacity function κ, the existence of a κ-DP -subgraph of G: a spanning bipartite subgraph H of G with partite sets P and D where for each i ∈ D the degree of i in H is min {κ(i), d G (i)} and for every i ∈ P
1 The reader unfamiliar with graph theoretic terminology can skip ahead to the beginning of Section 3 for the formal definitions. the degree of i in H is positive.
2 While a κ-DP -subgraph is purely graph theoretic, it has an intuitive economic interpretation: in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, every agent must be either a driver or a passenger who is nominated (by a neighbour who is a driver), and no agent can be both. The proof also suggests an algorithm that finds a specialised equilibrium in polynomial time.
While the model is too rich for formal theories of equilibrium selection, we can relate equilibria to efficiency. We adopt a strong measure of efficiency, saying that a pure strategy equilibrium is efficient (inefficient) if the set of Drivers, the 'D-set', is minimal (maximal) amongst all equilibrium outcomes. 3 One might conjecture that the size of both maximal and minimal D-sets is always non-increasing as capacity increases since at least as much sharing is possible. We show via some examples that this is not the case. However, for any two ordered capacity functions κ and κ (i.e., κ(i) ≤ κ (i)
for every vertex i), our second result, Theorem 2, shows that a minimal D-set for κ is never larger than a maximal D-set for κ.
4
With the above ideas fixed we can now introduce the general model. The difference is that the choice of quantity is not simply 0 or 1, but rather any non-negative integer.
Preferences are now defined by a quantity q * at which an individual becomes satiated (in the Netflix Game q * = 1 since nobody benefits from access to more than one account). The main difference in this richer set up is that there can be pure strategy Nash equilibria in which everybody contributes a strictly positive quantity. However, our focus is on so-called specialised pure strategy Nash equilibria, wherein Drivers contribute the optimal quantity of the good q * and Passengers free ride (in the Netflix Game every pure strategy equilibrium is specialised). The reason for this focus becomes clear when we repeat the game and introduce best-response dynamics. However, since an individual's choice of nomination is not payoff relevant to themself, the number of best-responses can be enormous. As such we restrict attention to nicely balanced specialised equilibria -those in which every individual in P nominates at least one of the 2 Our model does not admit a potential function (Shapley and Monderer, 1996) which would render the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium immediate.
3 A weaker criterion would be to consider equilibrium outcomes in which the D-set does not contain a proper subset that supports another equilibrium outcome.
4 D-sets are closely related to the well-studied graph theoretic concepts of "maximal independent sets" and "minimal dominating sets", see, e.g., Goddard and Henning (2013) . However, by definition no two maximally independent sets nor minimally dominating sets can exhibit set inclusion, whereas it is possible for two D-sets to be so ordered. individuals in D who nominated them. We then fix the nominations and consider only deviations in action choice. We show that only nicely balanced specialised equilibria are are locally stable to unilateral deviations in action choice. In particular non-specialised equilibria are not robust.
Our debt to the existing literature is obvious. Without the nominating component, or equivalently when each agent's capacity is at least equal to their degree, our model is a graphical game (Kearns et al., 2013) in which actions are strategic substitutes equivalent to a discretised version of that in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) . In particular when the action choice is {0, 1} our model reduces to the best-shot game of Galeotti et al. (2010) .
5 Without the action choice component, our model falls under the umbrella of "network formation". 6 The network formation component to our model is perhaps closest to the "Announcement Game" in Myerson (1991) but with two main differences.
First, in Myerson's model each agent may nominate any subset of individuals whereas in our model each agent i must nominate precisely min {κ(i), d G (i)} others. Second, in our model who you nominate is not payoff relevant, rather all that matters is who nominates you.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates our analysis with three examples. The first shows how the set of equilibrium outcomes to the best-shot game (our model with no capacity constraints) can change dramatically once capacity constraints are imposed. The second shows that finding a monotonic sequence of D-sets for increasing capacities is not possible and also that the number of equilibria need not increase with relaxing capacity constraints. The third shows a graph wherein a nicely balanced specialised profile is robust, but another pure strategy equilibrium is not. Section 3 introduces the model and proves existence of a specialised Nash equilibrium for every capacity function and every graph. Section 4 examines comparative statics and efficiency. Section 5 introduces dynamics and shows that specialised equilibria are necessary for stability. Section 6 concludes with a summary of our results and 5 The original best-shot game is due to Hirshleifer (1983) , but it did not have a network component. The best-shot game is often used to study costly information acquisition. See for example Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Conley and Udry (2010) who study whether new crop-harvesting technology is shared between farmers.
6 Network formation is typically modelled either as the realisation of a random process (originating with the Erdős-Renyi model (Erdős and Rényi, 1959; Gilbert, 1959) ) or via a non-cooperative gametheoretic formulation as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and the Myerson (1991) . See Chapters 4-6 of the textbook Jackson (2008) . some suggestions for further research on this topic.
Examples
This section discusses three examples that illustrate features of the model and highlights some of our main results. The first example shows that specialised equilibrium outcomes to local public good provision can change dramatically with the introduction of capacity constraints. The second example shows how, within the class of specialised equilibria, the non-monotonicity of D-sets (those who contribute) can evolve as the constraints on capacity are relaxed. In particular, the most efficient equilibrium outcomes (that we define as those with the smallest D-sets) may not occur when capacity is maximal.
The third example illustrates how only specialised equilibria are candidates for being dynamically stable in the long run.
Example 1. There is a social network of 5 individuals arranged in a star as depicted in Figure 1 . We label the peripheral players h, i, j, and k and the central player . by an equilibrium, the reason being that if purchases an account then she can only nominate 3 of her 4 neighbours which will leave one without access. It is then optimal for this un-nominated neighbour to purchase an account, but he in turn must nominate who subsequently would no longer want to purchase. So in this example, restricting attention to equilibrium outcomes, the number of adopters in equilibrium can only decrease as Netflix permit more "shareability".
Example 2. The previous example suggests a natural conjecture. This is, loosely put, that the size of D-sets will not increase as capacity increases. The following example
shows that this conjectures is not correct and also highlights some other interesting features of the set up.
We imagine a couple Isabella and John, I and J, who are planning on introducing their friends to one another at a gathering. We refer to Isabella's friends as i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 , and John's friends as j 1 , j 2 , and j 3 . Isabella knows her friends and John knows his friends; no other pair of individuals have previously met. This social network is depicted in Figure 3 . The gathering will take place at a restaurant outside of town and so people must travel by car. While everybody owns a car and will drive if needs be, it is preferable to get a ride than to drive oneself (one can then drink alcohol, save on fuel costs, save on parking costs, etc.).
In this example, a person's capacity is the number of passenger seats in their car.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that everybody's car is the same size and consider how the equilibria vary as capacities are increased. (Note that to economise on space we are somewhat loose and describe equilibria by naming only the drivers, i.e., the D-set.) When everyone's car can give a ride to only one passenger, κ is equal to 1 for everybody, there is only one equilibrium with D-set D 1 = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , j 1 , j 2 , j 3 }.
For κ equal to 2, D 1 is again the only D-set. When κ is increased to 3, three new equilibria emerge. This collection of equilibria have D-sets given by
with Isabella offering a ride only to her three friends and John offering a ride to his three friends, D 3 = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , J} and D 4 = {I, j 1 , j 2 , j 3 }. Thus for κ equal to 3, there is an equilibrium with only two people driving. This equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4 below as a subgraph of the social network with drivers again in blue and passengers in red, and arrows between the two originating at drivers offering a ride. When κ increases to 4, the model reduces to the best-shot game for which adopters in equilibrium form a maximal independent set (the collection of which is D 1 , D 3 , and D 4 ) for which at least 4 people drive. We note some other interesting features illustrated by this example. First, when κ is equal to 1 or 2, there is no equilibrium in which I or J drive which highlights a difference between D-sets and maximal independent sets, since for any graph every vertex is part of at least one maximal independent set. Second, and referencing the original conjecture, the equilibrium with the fewest number of drivers occurs with κ equal to 3 for each individual, at which point individuals I and J both have degree greater than their capacity. 7 Third, the number of equilibrium outcomes decreased as κ increased from 3 to 4. Furthermore, while increasing capacity may lead to an increase in the number of equilibria, it may remove the most efficient equilibrium (that with the fewest drivers). Lastly, consider an amendment to the graph in Figure 3 such that i 1 and i 2 are friends. For κ = 1 there is an equilibrium with D-set D 1 where 6 people drive, but when capacity is maximal the largest D-set is the maximal independent set of maximum size which has only 5 elements.
Example 3. The previous examples were special cases of the general model -those where the action set is simply {0, 1} (i.e., do not purchase / purchase, and do not drive / drive). In the general model, the action set is the set of non-negative integers and there is a most-desired quantity that we denote by q * . By "most desired" we mean that once an individual's total quantity received (his own action choice added to the action choices of those who nominated him) reaches q * , he is satiated.
In this richer model, there can be pure strategy equilibria where some individuals choose a strictly positive action choice that is less than q * . We call equilibria in which individuals choose either action 0 or action q * specialised. (In the first two examples q * was equal to 1, so all pure strategy equilibria were specialised.) We will show via an example that pure strategy equilibria that are not specialised may not be stable.
We consider a social network with 6 agents denoted i, j, k, , m, and n. Individual j is linked to everybody, individuals i and k are linked to j and one other, while all other individuals are linked to j and exactly two others. This is depicted in Panel A of Figure 5 below. In addition to the larger action space, this example is more complex in that we allow capacities to differ across agents. Specifically, we suppose that the capacity for j is equal to 3 and the capacity for all other individuals is equal to 1. Lastly, we suppose that the optimal quantity of the good is q * = 4.
Panel B of Figure 5 presents a pure strategy that is not specialised, while Panel C presents a specialised equilibrium. Our focus is on the equilibrium in Panel B. All agents choose positive quantities where the quantity is given by the number beside their name. Arrows depict nominations with the number of arrows originating at each vertex equal to that individual's capacity. It is a pure strategy since, for every agent, the sum of their quantity choice and the in-flow of quantities from other individuals who nominate them is equal to 4 (= q * ).
Now we consider dynamics. We imagine that agent i unilaterally decreases his action choice from 3 to 2. We label the time, t, at which this happens by 0. We label the action profile at this time by x (0) , where ordering the players as before we have that
n ) = (2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1). Our interest is in the evolution of the sequence of action profiles
where for all t ≥ 1, elements in the profile
is the best-action response for the relevant agent to x (t−1) . Importantly, we imagine that the nominations of each agent are held fixed.
It is also important to emphasise that when it comes to studying dynamics, the modeller must be aware of who each player nominates. The reason can be seen from considering a specialised equilibrium. In the static case, it did not matter who those that made an action choice of 0 nominated. But in the dynamic environment, if one those individuals deviates in their action choice, then this will have repercussions that can only be analysed if the nominations are known.
In turns of updating their action choice, the behavioural rule is one of myopic best-response (in action, not nomination as this is held fixed). Specifically, each agent examines the total currently being supplied to him. If this total is less than 4, then he makes up the difference by increasing his own supply; if this total is more than 4 then he decreases his own supply. Thus in period 1, the only individuals who will alter their action are i and j as each receive a total of 3 (i provides 2 himself and receives 1 from n who nominated him, while j provides 1 himself and receives 2 from agent i who nominated him). Since both are 1 unit short of q * = 4, they will each increase their period 0 action by 1. We thus get that
n ) = (3, 2, 3, 1, 2, 1). The evolution of this behaviour can then be traced and is done in Table   3 below.
We note that the action profiles evolve in a seemingly irregular way until period 13 at which point it starts to cycle between everybody choose 4 in even periods and everybody choose 0 in odd periods. So population behaviour was initially at a nonspecialised equilibrium, one individual's action choice was changed by 1 unit and then all players were allowed to update. Surprisingly, this small deviation from the nonspecialised equilibrium led to a complete unravelling. In Proposition 2 we show that is not a coincidence. For every non-specialised equilibrium, if the action choice of any agent not choosing q * is perturbed slightly, then this will always occur. 2  1  3  1  2  1  2  3  2  3  1  2  1  3  3  1  2  1  1  0  4  4  1  3  2  2  2  5  2  0  3  1  1  1  6  3  2  4  1  3  3  7  1  1  2  0  1  0  8  4  3  3 
The Model
We begin with the graph theoretic terminology required to describe the model.
An undirected graph G = (V, E) consists of a nonempty finite set V = V (G) of elements called vertices and a finite set E = E(G) of unordered pairs of distinct vertices called edges. We call V (G) the vertex set of G and E(G) the edge set of G. In other words, an edge {i, j} is a 2-element subset of V (G). We will often denote an edge {i, j} by ij. For edge ij ∈ E(G) we say that i and j are the end-vertices, and say that endvertices are adjacent. We say that vertex i is incident to edge e if it is an end-vertex of e. A graph G on n vertices is called complete if every two distinct vertices in G are adjacent; G will be denoted by K n .
A path in a G is a finite sequence of edges which connect a sequence of distinct vertices. A graph is connected if there is at least one path containing each pair of vertices. We define the neighbourhood of a vertex i, N G (i), in a graph G to be the set of vertices that vertex i is adjacent to, N G (i) = {j ∈ V : ij ∈ E}, and we say that
For a connected graph with at least two vertices, the neighbourhood of every vertex is nonempty.
With the above we can now introduce the game theoretic model. In the model, vertices are interpreted as players and edges represent connections between pairs of players. We assume the population (vertex set) is of size n and that the graph G is connected.
Let X = {0, 1, . . . ,x} denote the finite set of actions common to each agent. Actions have both a private and (local) public benefit, but only a private cost. Writing N 0 for the set of non-negative integers, there is a capacity function κ : V → N 0 that specifies, for each player, how many of his neighbours may benefit from his action choice. This subset of neighbours are said to be nominated. If a player's capacity is zero then he nominates no neighbours; if a player's capacity is at least as great as his degree then all of his neighbours are nominated. Formally, for any nonempty set A and nonnegative
this, player i's set of pure strategies is given by
representing the collection of subsets of N G (i) of size κ(i).
We write x i for individual i's action choice from X, and m i for his nominating choice Given the above, the utility to player i, U i , from strategy profile (x, m) is given by
where we assume that (i) c > 0, and (ii) there exists a q * ∈ X such that
Note that this definition implies that it makes no sense for a player i to increase The utility function as defined in (1) is very general. It does not require concavity of f as in that of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) . If we take X = {0, 1}, f (x) = 1 for all x ≥ 1, and 0 < c < 1, then the game becomes the "Netflix Game with κ-user sharing rule".
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is defined in the usual way.
Definition 1. A strategy profile (x * , m * ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if for every i = 1, . . . , n, and every x i ∈ X i and every m i ∈ M i we have
We have the following: Proposition 1. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists for any graph G and any
While the above is a strong result, we will focus on what, following Bramoullé and
Kranton (2007), we term specialised strategy profiles -those in which each agent either choose action x i = 0 or x i = q * . We have the following definition.
Definition 2. A specialised strategy profile is a pure strategy profile in which for all i ∈ V we have either x i = 0 or x i = q * .
We emphasise that specialised strategy profiles do not say anything about equilibrium since for that we must also know who nominated who. For example, all individuals choose action 0 is specialised but clearly not an equilibrium. We begin building up to such a definition now.
For a given specialised strategy profile (x, m), let D(x, m) = {i ∈ V : x i = q * } be those agents who supply q * , and P (x, m) = {i ∈ V : x i = 0}, where we interpret D and P as Drivers and Passengers respectively (Drivers provide while Passengers free ride). Clearly, at any specialised strategy profile, we have that both D ∩ P = ∅ and D ∪ P = V . However, we aim to go further. In words, we wish to find a strategy profile such that nobody in D is nominated by somebody else in D, and everyone in P is nominated by at least on person in D.
Some additional graph theoretic terminology is required. Given a graph G = (V (G), E(G)), we say that Abstracting from the actions chosen by the individuals, we wish find a spanning bipartite subgraph, H, of G, with partite sets D and P such that there does not exist an i ∈ D such that i ∈ m j for any j ∈ D, and for all i ∈ P there exists at least one j ∈ D such that i ∈ m j . This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 3. A spanning bipartite subgraph H of G with partite sets P and D is called a κ-DP -subgraph (or, simply a DP -subgraph if the function κ is fixed) if for each i ∈ D the degree of i in H is min {κ(i), d G (i)} and for every i ∈ P the degree of i in H is positive.
With this, we can define what it means for a strategy profile to be a balanced specialised profile as follows.
Definition 4. A specialised profile (x, m) is a balanced specialised profile supported
When it comes to adding dynamics, we will not only examine balanced specialised profiles, but we will also require that every vertex in P nominates at least one of the vertices from D who nominated him. This gives us the following stronger definition.
Definition 5. A specialised profile (x, m) is a nicely balanced specialised profile sup-
We now have the following theorem, which is an improvement of Proposition 1.
Theorem 1. For any graph G and common utility function as given by (1), there exists a nicely balanced specialised profile and all nicely balanced strategy profiles are pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Proof. The proof has two parts. The first is to show that every graph G possesses at least one κ-DP -subgraph. The second is then to show that a nicely balanced strategy profile induced by κ-DP -subgraph involves each agent choosing the optimal action.
Here we prove the following statement: If G is a graph and κ : V (G) → N 0 is a function, then G has a DP -subgraph.
The proof proceeds by induction on the number n of vertices of G. If n = 1, then G is a DP subgraph with D = V (G) and P = ∅.
Now assume the claim is true for all graphs with fewer than n 0 ≥ 2 vertices, and let G be a graph on n 0 vertices.
Case 1: There is a vertex i of degree at most κ(i). Let B be the star with center i and leaves N G (i), where
Set D = {i} and P = N G (i). If G has no vertices then B is clearly a DP -subgraph of G.
Otherwise, by induction hypothesis, G has a DP -subgraph H with partite sets P and D . Construct a subgraph H of G from the disjoint union of H and B by adding to it for every j ∈ D with
edges of G between j and N (i). Set D = D ∪ {i} and P = P ∪ N (i).
To see that H is a DP -subgraph of G, observe that (a) H is a spanning bipartite subgraph of G as H and B are bipartite and the added edges are between D and P only, (b) every vertex j ∈ D has degree in H equal to min{κ(j), d G (j)}, (c) every vertex k ∈ P is of positive degree (since it is so in both B and H ).
Case 2: For every vertex j ∈ V (G), d G (j) > κ(j). Let i be an arbitrary vertex.
Delete d G (i) − κ(i) edges incident to i and denote the resulting graph by L.
Observe that every DP -subgraph of L is a DP -subgraph of G since no vertex in L has degree less than κ(i). This reduces Case 2 to Case 1.
To complete the proof it remains to show that a nicely balanced strategy profile induced by a κ-DP -subgraph is a Nash equilibrium. Let (x * , m * ) be a nicely balanced specialised profile. As mentioned before, we note that the utility function defined in
(1) does not depend on m i . Thus player i cannot increase her payoff by deviating from m * i . If i ∈ D then by the definition of a nicely specialised profile induced by a κ-DP subgraph, we have x * i = q * and {j∈N G (i): i∈m * j } x * j = 0. Thus is follows from the definition of the utility of i that for all x that are obtained from x * by replacing
If i ∈ P then x * i = 0 and {j∈N G (i): i∈m * j } x * j = sq * for some s > 1. Thus by the observation just after the definition of the utility function, for all x that are obtained from x * by replacing x * i = 0 by any t > 0 we calculate
We now make some observations about Theorem 1 and in particular κ-DP -subgraphs and their associated D-sets and P -sets.
Fix a graph G = (V, E).
An independent set is a subset of vertices no pair of which are adjacent, and a maximal independent set is an independent set that is not a proper subset of any other. A dominating set is a set of vertices such that every vertex in V is either in the set or has a neighbour in the set, and a minimal dominating set is a dominating set that does not contain a proper subset that is dominating. (Note that the notion of dominating is defined only for sets whereas our concept of nominating is defined for individual vertices and by considering multiple nominating vertices can be extended to sets.) We now relate D-sets to maximal independent sets and minimal dominating sets. For a further discussion of some of the properties of D-sets, refer to Appendix A.
Clearly a D-set is a dominating set though the reverse need not hold. Indeed, in a complete graph K n every vertex forms a dominating set, but if κ(i) < d(i) for every i ∈ V (K n ), then no singleton can be a D-set. We will add further observations. First, as with dominating sets but not independent sets, it is possible that two vertices in D are adjacent in G. An instance of this was seen in the second example of Section 2 for the equilibrium in which the only adopters two central vertices were the only adopters.
(which is by definition dominating). Third, and related to the previous observation, is that unlike maximal independent sets, for a given graph G and capacity function κ, 
Efficiency and Comparative Statics
In this section we focus on the efficiency of balanced specialised profiles. For a given graph and a given capacity function κ, there are often multiple balanced strategy profiles, so our attention is on those with the smallest and largest D-sets (that we interpret this a measure of efficiency/inefficiency). We then consider how incremental amendments to the model will affect such (in)efficiency. There are two natural ways to amend the model. The first is to incrementally increase the capacities of the agents, while the second is to alter the underlying graph, G, either by adding/deleting an edge or by adding/deleting a vertex and all the edges it is incident to.
Recall that for a specialised strategy profile (x * , m * ), D(x, m) denotes the set of individuals who adopt. We say that a balanced specialised profile (x, m) is efficient if its associated D-set is of minimal size, and inefficient if it is of maximal size. Theorem 2. For every graph G, δ
To prove the theorem is sufficient to show that
We proceed by induction on n + m, where n is the number of vertices of G and m is the number of edges in G. If n + m = 1, then G consists of a single vertex and setting D = V (G) and P = ∅ gives the only DP -subgraph for both κ and κ + . We may assume that G is connected as otherwise we can consider its components and apply the induction hypothesis on the component containing j and the vertices in the other components have the same values for κ and κ + . Let G = K 1,n−1 , where n ≥ 2 and j is the center of the star. If κ + (j) ≥ n − 1, then δ κ + min (G) = 1 and we are done. Otherwise, V (G) − j is a D-set for both κ and κ + .
is weakly efficient if there does not exist another balanced specialised profile (
Note further that such a definition is not useful with the best-shot game since by definition any two maximal independent sets do not have the set inclusion property.
9 The graph in Example 2 showed that the smallest D-set can both decrease and increase as capacity increases. We also saw that the largest D-set can decrease in the same example by adding an edge between any pair of Isabella's friends. To see that the largest D-sets can increase in size consider the complete graph K 7 on 7 vertices. Pick two 2 vertices i, j and let κ(i) = κ(j) = 2 and κ(x) = 6 for all other vertices x. Then all equilibria have D-sets of size 1 (and all vertices except i and j can form a D-set) and thus δ Now we may assume that n ≥ 3, G is connected and there is an edge in G which is not incident to j. Consider two cases.
Case 1: There is a vertex i ∈ V (G) − j of degree at most κ(i). Let B be the the star with center i and leaves N G (i), where N G (i) is the neighbourhood of i in G. Let G = G − B. Set D = {i} and P = N (i). If G has no vertices then B is clearly a κ-DP -subgraph and κ + -DP -subgraph of G.
Otherwise, by induction hypothesis, δ
, where k is κ restricted to G . The two corresponding DP -subgraphs of G can be extended to those of G by adding i to their D-sets and N (i) to their P -sets and adding to every ∈ D with
Case 2: The degree of every vertex i ∈ V (G) − j is larger than κ(i). Choose any edge i such that j ∈ {i, } and delete it from G. By induction hypothesis, for the resulting graph G we have δ
. It remains to observe that the two DP -subgraphs of G are also DP -subgraphs of G (the functions κ and κ + were not changed and the deleted edges are not needed).
Stability of Specialised Profiles
In this section we introduce dynamics with the goal of examining which strategy profiles are robust to unilateral deviations. Recalling that an agent's utility is unaffected by his choice of nomination, the number of best-responses for each agent may be enormous. As such, throughout we will assume the nominating profile is fixed and consider only the what action choices are optimal given the nominating profile and the action choices of others. We call this restricted best-response a best-action response. Given a nomination profile m and the action profile x, it is not hard to see that the best-action response of agent i, B i,m (x), is given by
We extend this to the best-action reply dynamic B m : X → X as
Definition 6. Given an action profile x we define the best action evolution of x recursively by x (0) = x and for t ≥ 1,
We are interested in comparing population level contributions. As such we will wish to order action profiles wherever possible. For any two action profiles x, x ∈ X, we say x ≥ x if x i ≥ x i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and x > x if x i ≥ y i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x j > y j for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We then have the following results.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (x * , m * ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and let x ≤ x * .
Then the best action evolution of x satisfies for all t ≥ 0
Proof. Let t = 0. Then by assumption x (0) ≤ x * . If we choose i to be an individual with x * i = 0, then clearly we have x
(1) i ≥ 0 = x * i = 0. Now, let i be an individual with x * i = 0. Then
i .
Thus x
(1) i ≥ x * i and x (1) ≥ x * . By considering individuals with x (2) = 0 separately, we can use the same argument to shows that
The result then follows easily by induction.
Lemma 1 implies that if we take a pure strategy Nash equilibrium action profile x * ,
for any x ≤ x * the best action evolution of x either oscillate around x * forever, or there exists an t 0 such that for all t ≥ t 0 , x (t) = x * . Note that this is the case as we consider only finite networks and so there are only a finite number of different possibilities for the x t and therefore they have to repeat. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 7. We say that the best action evolution of x settles in x * if there exists an t 0 such that for all t ≥ t 0 , we have x (t) = x * .
We emphasise that Lemma 1 holds for all Nash equilibrium strategy profiles and not simply specialised ones. While Lemma 1 is a statement about the population action profiles, the next two results, Lemmas 2 and 3 are statements about best-action responses at the level of the individual. We emphasise again that both results apply to all pure strategy Nash equilibria, not simply specialised ones. The first lemma is an immediate corollary of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose that (x * , m * ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Let x < x * .
Then the best action evolution of x satisfies the following:
We will need the following lemma which essentially says that a state reacts to any changes of states that affect it unless does not need to provide anything, that is x can remain zero and is still satisfied.
Lemma 3. Suppose that (x * , m * ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Let x ≤ x * be an action profile and consider the best action evolution of x. Let be nominated by i,
Proof. We first show (3). So assume
. Then, by Lemma 1, t must be odd. Now, again using Lemma 1, we have for ∈ m i
Rearranging and adding q * to both sides of this inequality gives that
But note that by the best-action response (2) and because we assume that x (t) > 0 the right hand side is equal to x (t) . Also x (t+1) equals either the left hand side of the above inequality or is equal to zero and in both cases is smaller than x (t) . The inequality in (4) is shown in a similar manner.
We now introduce our notion of stability when the nominating profile is held fixed and actions are updated according to the best-action reply dynamic. In words, we say that action profile x is stable relative to the nomination profile m, if, when the action of any individual is changed by some strictly positive amount, repeated application of the best-action reply dynamic will lead population behaviour back to action profile x.
Definition 8. We say that strategy profile (x, m) is action stable if there exists δ ≥ 1 such that for any i = 1, . . . , n and any action profile x with x j = x j for j = i and |x i − x i | ≤ δ the best action evolution of x settles in x.
In other words a strategy profile is action stable if one can change any one coordinate by at most δ and the best action evolution will settle in x. The following result shows that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium profile that is not balanced specialised is not action stable and thus, a strategy profile being balanced and specialised, supported by a κ-DP -subgraph, is necessary for action stability.
Proposition 2. Suppose that (x * , m * ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium such that
Proof. Define L := j : 0 < x * j < q * . By assumption ∈ L. First we will show that cannot be the only element in the set L. This is immediate since
Thus, there exists some j ∈ L such that j ∈ N G ( ), ∈ m * j . It follows that there exist
(For the readers familiar with graph theory we can build a directed graph on L with an arc from j to i if i ∈ m * j . The above result implies that every vertex has at least one in-neighbour and hence the graph contains a cycle.) By renaming if necessary we may assume that i j = j for all j = 1, . . . , k, so for i = 1, . . . , k we have i ∈ L, i ∈ m * i+1 and k ∈ m * 1 . We define x by subtracting 1 from the first coordinate of x * , that is,
We claim that x does not settle in x * . We prove the claim by contradiction. In particular we assume that there exists a (minimal) t 0 such that for all t ≥ t 0 and for all i = 1, . . . , k, we have x
1 . Also for all i = 1, . . . , k, we have x
The contradiction now follows from Lemma 3 by choosing i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
i and = i + 1. Such an i exists as we have chosen t 0 minimal.
While Proposition 2 says that balanced specialised profiles are necessary for stability, the following result, Proposition 3 shows that they are not sufficient. However, Proposition 4 shows that balanced specialised profiles supported by a κ-DP -subgraphs with a mild density condition are sufficient for stability.
Proposition 3. Suppose (x * , m * ) is a nicely balanced specialised profile induced by κ-DP -subgraph H of G, and suppose further that d H (i) = 1 for some i ∈ P . Then
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that 1 ∈ P , d H (1) = 1 and that 2 is the neighbour of 1 in H. Note that x * 2 = q * as the strategy profile is nicely balanced and specialised. Consider
We claim that x does not settle in x * . To see this we prove by induction that for all odd t we have x (t) 1 > 0 and for all even t we have x t 2 < q * , Clearly this is true for t = 0 and also for t = 1 as the best action response for 1 is x
(1) 1 = 1 > 0. Now assume that the statement is true for all t ≤ t 0 with t 0 ≥ 2. If t 0 is even then by induction hypothesis x t 0 2 < q * and by Lemma 1 for all j ∈ P we have x (t 0 ) j ≤ x * j = 0 and thus x (t 0 ) j = 0. Since 1 is only nominated by 2 and perhaps elements in P , the best action response for 1 is x 
Thus, if there exists a nicely balanced specialised profile with an individual in P who is nominated by only one agent in D, then the equilibrium is not stable. However, the following proposition shows that if all individuals in P are nominated by at least 2 individuals in D, then the equilibrium is action-stable.
is a nicely balanced specialised profile induced by κ-DP -subgraph H of G, and suppose further that d H (i) = 2 for all i ∈ P .
Then (x * , m * ) is stable.
Proof. Choose ε = 1. We must consider deviations by those in D and those in P . We begin with those in D.
Case 1: i ∈ D. By definition x * i = q * . There are two subcases: Either we increase x * j by one or we decrease x * j by one. In the first case, i.e. x satisfies x (0)
In the second case let x satisfy x (0) i = x * i − 1 = q * − 1 and for all j = i, x (0) j = x * j . By our assumption for all j ∈ P there is at least one neighbour k = i, k ∈ D with j ∈ m * k and thus max q * − {k∈N j (G) : j∈m k } x k , 0 = 0. It follows that
x
(1) j = 0 for all j ∈ P . For all j ∈ D we have x
(1) j = q * by Lemma 1 (or one can just observe only vertices in k ∈ P are nominating j and all these vertices satisfy
Case 2: i ∈ P. By definition x * i = 0, so the only deviation is to choose x (0) i = 1 and
Consider an individual h ∈ P with h = i, and consider how all of H's neighbours in the nominating network will behave in period 1. We have
≥ 2(q * − 1)
≥ q * where the last inequality follows since q * ≥ 2. And thus, B h,m * (x (0) ) = 0.
Furthermore, Since H is a κ-DP -subgraph, we have that N H (i) ⊆ P for all i ∈ D, and thus the set {j ∈ N G (i) : i ∈ m j } ⊆ P for all i in D. Thus, for all ∈ D, we must have that B
2
,m * (x (0) ) = q * since B i,m * (x (0) ) = 0 for all i ∈ P .
Therefore, (x * , m * ) is stable.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a network model of public goods in which individuals face a capacity constraint as to how many neighbours they may share with. Each agent much decide how much of the good to provide and which subset of his neighbours to share with. We focus on a subclass of pure strategy equilibria, that we term specialised equilibria, wherein each agent provides either the most desirable quantity (is a 'Driver') or provides nothing (is a 'Passenger'). Interestingly, as capacities are increased the number of Drivers across specialised equilibria need not decrease.
The model has a second interpretation wherein the nomination component is viewed as pure network formation, with public good provision then occurring via the realised network. Our model is thus one of the first to have a network formation component coupled with a rich underlying game. While we introduce dynamics later in the paper, we do so with the nomination component held fixed. Relaxing this would yield the first model (to our knowledge) that captures the coevolution of behaviour and network formation. This is left to future research.
APPENDIX A Properties of D-sets
First we show some upper and lower bounds on the sizes of D-sets for all graphs. Subsequently we look at specific classes of graphs that are commonly studied. The following definitions are required. For a G = (V, E) be a graph and capacity function κ : V → N 0 , we define κ = min i κ(i),κ = max i κ(i), and d G := min i d G (i). Furthermore, letting R denote the real line, we define the ceiling and floor functions as follows: for any x ∈ R, let x := min {n ∈ N | x ≤ n} and let x := max {n ∈ N | x ≥ n}.
A.1 Bounds on D-sets
Lemma 4. Let G = (V, E) be a graph and κ : V → N 0 be a capacity function. Then for any κ-DPsubgraph H of G we have, That is, there are least k agents in R and at most |V | 1+k k. Thus, since G is a complete network, we make each agent in D nominate k agents in R such that D ∪ R = G and obtain κ-DP -subgraph of G.
For the upper bound, we choose |V | − k individuals as elements in D. Then there exists exactly k remaining individuals that we refer to as P . Since G is a complete graph, we make it such that all individuals in D nominate each of the k remaining agents in P and obtain κ-DP -subgraph of G. Thus we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that G = (V, E) is a complete graph and 1 ≤ κ(i) = k ≤ |G| − 1 for all i. Then we have
Moreover there exist bipartite k-DP -subgraphs H andH with partite sets (D, P ) and (D,P ) such that 
